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The aim of this paper is to highlight the role that our lived body has in shaping our 
perceptual life. Through husserl’s description of the way in which we perceive the world 
around us, we will underline the fact that our body is not just an object among others for us, 
but a fundamental constitutive principle of our own experience. in this way, we will try to 
maintain that to perceive is, in some sense, to have an implicit and pre-reflective knowledge 
of our embodied relation to the world.
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in The ecological approach to Visual Perception, the american psychologist 
James J. gibson states:
We human observers take it for granted that one sees the environment with 
one’s eyes...But the truth is that each eye is positioned in a head that is in turn 
positioned on a trunk that is positioned on legs that maintain the posture 
of the trunk, head, and eyes relative to the surface of support…One sees the 
environment not with eyes but with the eyes-in-the-head-on-the-body-resting-
on-the-ground. (gibson 1986, 205). 
this is not a banal claim. it highlights, instead, one of the most important 
aspects of the constitution of visual perception and perceptual objects– 
that is, the embodied nature of our experience of the world. as the 
phenomenological tradition has well underlined (husserl 1907; merleau-
Ponty 1945), our body is not just an object among others for us but it plays 
a primary role in shaping our perceptual life. in this sense, despite the 
great variety of meanings that the notion of “embodiment” has today in 
the philosophical and psychological debate, what we will mean by this term 
here is just the phenomenological fact that our lived body– that is, our body 
as we experience it from the first-person perspective– plays a fundamental 
function as a transcendental principle– that is, a condition of possibility– for 
the constitution of the objects of our own experience.
One of the most important fields in which this fact can be appreciated 
is visual perception. husserl, in particular, has developed an interesting 
description of the phenomenology of our perceptual experience of the world 
around us, underlining the conditions of possibility for our experience to be 
as it is and trying to show the roots of the constituted perceived object– that 
is, the roots of  the object as it appears in the acts of consciousness. doing 
this, he has perfectly recognized how our lived body and, in particular, the 
experienced sense of our body and its abilities, are necessary conditions of 
possibility for the phenomenology of visual perception. 
The aim of this paper, then, is, in the first place, to recollect those analyses 
of  husserl’s of the phenomenology of vision that highlight the role of our 
lived body for the constitution of perceptual objects; in the second place, 
to put these descriptions together with some empirical findings that can 
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underline the same topics from a psychological point of view. in this way, 
we will try to maintain the idea that to perceive is, in some sense, to have an 
implicit and pre-reflective knowledge of our embodied relation to the world; 
or as the american philosopher alva noë says, “…to understand, implicitly, 
the effects of movement on sensory stimulation” (noë 2004, 1).
now, husserl’s analysis of the constitutive function of the body is well 
developed into two important works: the course of lectures of 1907, known 
as ding und raum, and the second volume of the ideas (husserl 1952). in 
this paper, then, i will follow husserl’s thought through these two works, 
analyzing, in particular, the role of the body as the bearer of the zero point 
of orientation and the role of kinaesthesia (that is, the sense of our movement 
or stillness) for the “constitution of the object as an identity in a manifold of 
appearances” (Zahavi 1994, 68).
One of the first and main features that Husserl underlines when he talks 
about visual perception is the fact that perceptual objects are never given 
in their totality, but always in a certain profile (husserl 1952, 160-161). every 
perspectival appearance, nevertheless, presupposes not only something that 
appears, but also something that it appears for; this has to be the point from 
which that particular perspective is originated or, better, the point of view 
that motivates– that is, that gives reasons for– the appearance of  that certain 
profile of the object instead of another. Now, the bearer of this privileged 
point of view, that husserl calls  “the zero point of orientation” (husserl 
1952, 160), is our body.
everything in the world, in fact, has a particular orientation in relation to 
our body and the way in which we can talk about the place of things in the 
surrounding space reveals this relationship. We can say that something is 
near or far from us, that now, in this room, this book is on my right and that cup 
of coffee on my left, or that there is a door in front of me and a piano behind me. 
the orientation of things can obviously be changed: thanks to the ability of 
free movement of my body, in fact, i can move around in the room so that the 
piano will appear in front of me and the door behind, the cup of coffee on the 
right and the book on the left. but, though they have been changed in their 
orientation, the objects i see continue to be oriented in relation to me, to that 
“here” where my body always is. in our immediate experience of the external 
world, then, we have a unique position because we are the centre around which 
the spatio-temporal things are organized. but this is possible only because we 
have a three-dimensional body that is in space as the other material things are 
and that can, in this way, be in a particular perspectival relation to the objects 
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of the world. in other words, spatial things can appear as they do only to an 
embodied subject, whose body, then, must be regarded as a condition of possibility 
for other objects.1
let us come back for a while to the previous scenery of the objects in my 
room. i can say that the door is in front of me and the piano behind, and 
that, if I turn back to 180 degrees, I can find the piano in front of me and the 
door behind. but, being able to describe this situation in this way means not 
only that every object is oriented to me and, so, that i am the centre of this 
orientation; but also that, in some sense, i am able to experience my body, 
its position and its relation to the surrounding world. in other words, my 
perception of the door or the piano must contain some information about 
my body too, to allow me to know how those objects are oriented towards me.
the psychologist James J. gibson well underlines this point when he describes 
some experiments about affordances perception– that is, the perception of 
the pragmatic possibilities that the objects in the environment offer to the 
subject. The most significant studies, in particular, were those with the visual 
cliff– that is, a simulated drop-off arranged by the psychologists e. J. gibson 
and r.d. Walk to investigate depth perception in human and animal species 
(gibson and Walk 1960). these experiments showed that most infants with the 
ability to crawl avoid crossing over the simulated drop-off even though a rigid 
glass surface extends over it. the idea is that this happens because “optical 
information specifies a drop-off, and the conflicting haptic evidence for a 
solid supporting surface is generally insufficient to tempt the infant to move 
out on it” (gibson 1988, 29). 
now, how can visual perception give information about a drop-off– that 
is, about something dangerous for the subject? gibson’s thesis is that this 
can be possible mainly because every objective perception is strictly linked 
to the co-perception of the body, so that the information i gain about the 
world implicitly contains some information about myself. our perceptual 
experience, in fact, is full of information about our embodied position in the 
world and can provide, then, some data about the relationship between the 
observer and the observed object. in the empirical studies with the visual 
cliff, therefore, the drop-off can be perceived as something dangerous– or 
something that affords “falling”– because the perception of the cliff is 
inextricably linked to the co-perception of one’s body in that situation. in 
this sense, the infants involved in the described experimental setting have 
1 on this point see Zahavi (1994).
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information about the fact that their feet are far away from the ground and 
this leads them to avoid crossing over the glass surface (gibson 1986, 247).
But there is a final step to take, here. If every perceptual experience is a 
co-perception of my embodied position in the world, so that every objective 
perception is, in the meantime, the perception of the relationship between 
myself and the object, then i need to have at least some kind of perceptual 
experience of myself and, specifically for this purpose, of my body. in other 
words, visual perception can give me some information about my position 
in relation to the objects in the surrounding environment only if i have 
some kind of preliminary experience of myself and of myself as having a 
body or, better, as being a body; that is, only if i have some sense of me and, 
in particular, of me as an embodied subject. now, this primary sense of self 
is guaranteed by a specific kind of experience, that is proprioception. this is 
the implicit and pre-reflective awareness of my body as an organized entity 
in the environment. it seems to be a kind of experience that children have 
from birth and that constitutes the first base for the subject for a more 
explicit and reflective sense of himself. 2
Proprioception, then, is our first access to our body. But it is not as the 
other object-perceptions. in particular, it is not the perception of the body 
as an object among others, because it cannot be a perspectival awareness 
of the body without resulting in an infinite regress. As Shaun Gallagher 
states in how the Body Shapes the mind, “if one accepts the premise that sense 
perception of the world is spatially organized by an implicit reference to our 
bodily framework, the awareness that is the basis for that implicit reference 
cannot depend on perceptual awareness without the threat of infinite 
regress. To avoid the infinite regress one requires a pre-reflective bodily 
awareness that is built into the structures of perception and action, but that 
is not itself egocentric” (gallagher 2005, 137). in other words, proprioception 
does not offer a perspectival perception of my body because, if it did, it 
would require a second body as an index and this would generate the same 
problem of reference again. nevertheless, though it does not require the 
body itself to be a perceptual object, our pre-reflective proprioceptive 
experience gives us the first basic awareness of our embodied nature. 
as we have said earlier, this sense of ourselves as having a body and a spatial 
position between the objects we perceive is one condition of possibility for 
our perception to be as it is. For the constitution of our perceptual experience 
and of the objects of vision, then, it is necessary not only to have a body, but 
to have a sense of our body. In the next section we will focus on one specific 
2 on this point see gallagher and Zahavi (2008, 301-329) and gallagher (2005, 65-85).
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aspect of this “sense of our body” which is particularly important for the 
analysis of the constitution of the visual object. 
let us consider the following situation. i am moving in a dark room where 
there is only one visible object thanks to the illumination of a spotlight. 
if i move in a certain way– for example from the left to the right– i will 
experience the transition of a certain number of visual images which 
are constantly transformed into each other in a specific way. Now, let us 
suppose that it is not me the one who is moving, but the object, and that it 
is moving in a way that makes me experience the same  transition of images 
of the previous situation, when it was my body that was in movement. in 
both cases, then, I can see the same visual images; but if in the first scenario, 
i perceive a stationary object seen from different points of view, in the 
second, on the contrary, i perceive an object in movement.3
this mental experiment clearly shows that mere visual images are not able 
to give us all the information we gain in our perceptual experience; in this 
case, in fact, they do not allow me to distinguish if it is me or the object i see 
the one which is moving.
So, how can we have such different perceptual experiences if mere visual 
images do not give us sufficient information? Husserl clearly answers 
that it is possible thanks to the awareness of the body states (stillness 
or movement) – that is, thanks to the kinaesthetic sensations – that we 
constantly experience during every perception (husserl 1907, 215). in the 
situation we have described, in fact, i can experience my body as stationary 
or in movement and this possibility gives me the information i need to 
disambiguate my perception. In this sense, the same visual images that first 
show something stationary in relation to my kinaesthetic situation, can 
then show something in movement if i am in another kinaesthetic situation. 
the perceived difference between the object’s stillness and movement, then, 
is guaranteed by our kinetic relation to the objects we perceive.
there are, of course, some situations in which our own movement is not 
so easy to detect. let us suppose, as husserl proposes, that we are sitting 
in a coach in movement (husserl 1907, 344-345). if i am stationary in the 
coach, i will experience a constant kinaesthetic sensation– that is, a sensation 
of stillness, together with stationary images of the inside of the coach 
and a transition of images from the outside landscape. but this does not 
mean that i perceive myself as stationary and the landscape outside as in 
3 These scenarios, although slightly modified and simplified, are drawn from Husserl (1907, 
214-215).
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movement. on the contrary, i experience a stationary landscape and me as 
“in movement” or, better, as being moved. this can be possible because, even 
though we experience our body as stationary in the coach and the coach as 
stationary in relation to us, we can also experience the coach in movement 
through something such as the coach shaking, the noises of the wheels 
and so on. according to husserl, these conditions can take the place of the 
kinaesthetic sensations, thus making us perceive the scene as we do. So, if we 
exclude possible situations in which there is no perceivable element that can 
explain our perception as, instead, the coach shakes and the wheel noises in 
our example do, then we can say that the function mostly pertaining to the 
kinaesthetic sensations can also be played by other circumstances, though in 
an indirect way. 
notwithstanding their differences, all the situations that we have 
presented in this section show something fundamental for our purposes. 
they demonstrate, in particular, that conditions of possibility for the 
constitution of the objects of visual perception are not simply our body 
and the awareness of its position, but also our kinaesthetic sensations. as we 
have noted, in fact, feeling our own movement or our stillness is the way 
in which the same visual images can lead to different object perceptions. 
As we said at the end of the previous section, there is a specific aspect of 
proprioception worth underlining for a better account of the constitution of 
the perceptual object: it is our ability to experience our body movements or 
our stillness– that is, to have kinaesthetic sensations. 
but, as husserl clearly underlines in the lectures of 1907 (husserl 1907, 189-
246), kinaesthetic sensations are fundamental, in some particular cases, 
for another central aspect of our perception– that is, as Zahavi says, “the 
constitution of the object of perception as an identity in a manifold of 
appearances” (Zahavi 1994, 68). 
We know that one of the main features of visual objects is the fact that they 
can be seen from different points of view. as a consequence, they show 
different profiles depending on the perspective they are looked from. But, if 
we start moving around the object so that we can have the opportunity of 
seeing it from several perspectives, how can we know that we are looking at 
the same object? or, better, how can two different adumbrations be seen as 
the adumbrations of one and the same object? 
husserl’s idea is that this can be possible only if there is a continuous and 
uninterrupted transition between the two, so that, in some sense, they can 
“be able to merge into each other” (Zahavi 1994, 67). in other words, the 
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perceived unity of the object is guaranteed by the continuous transition that 
links many perceptions together. but, if it is me the one who is moving around 
the object, this transition between different perceptions can be guaranteed 
only by the continuous and uninterrupted course of my movement– that is, of 
my kinaesthetic course (husserl 1907, 227-230). this means, in other words, that, 
in situations like this, the experienced sense of the continuity of my movement 
is a necessary condition of possibility for two adumbrations to be experienced as 
two different perspectives of the same object.
all the situations we have described in this section clearly show that our 
kinaesthetic sensations play a fundamental motivating function for the objects 
to appear as they do. as husserl reminds us (husserl 1907, 244-245, 262-
265), there is a strict and specific correspondence between the position 
of the observer and the visible profile of the observed thing. In the same 
way, given a certain relation between the subject and the object, there 
is a specific correspondence between a certain movement of the former 
and a specific transition of the visual images of the latter, so that, if in a 
certain position i can see a certain adumbration of the object but i want to 
have another visual image that makes me see, for example, in the left part 
of my visual field what I previously had in the right one, there are some 
specific movements that I need to make (Husserl 1907, 218). In this sense, 
husserl states that all the aspects of the objects of perception are correlated 
through some rigid if-then connections (i.e. if i move this way, then this aspect 
will become visually accessible) and that these connections determine how 
the objects will look in relation to our movement.
So, our position and our movement motivate the specific perceptions we have 
and it is only because of this fundamental function of our body states that 
being proprioceptively aware of them let us perceive as we do, making us, for 
example, distinguish two different perceptual situations notwithstanding 
the identity of the visual images– as we have previously seen– or allowing 
us to recognize two different profiles as two different adumbrations of the 
same object. 
now, it is worth noting that the relationship between the experienced sense 
of our body states and the way in which we experience the world around 
us is underlined by many empirical findings too. Bauermeister (1964), for 
example, shows some important effects of body tilt on the perception of 
verticality. after having tilted the subject in a dark room through a heavy 
iron framework that could be rotated up to 360°, the experimenter measures 
the perceived verticality of a luminescent rod. data show that, depending on 
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the degree of the body tilt, there was a tendency to displace apparent from 
objective vertical either in the direction of the tilt or opposite to it. clearly, 
this experimental situation shows how the perception of our own posture 
can contribute to how we visually perceive the surrounding environment. 
in another experimental setting, described by gibson in The ecological 
approach to Visual Perception (gibson 1986, 286-289), the subject is sitting in 
a dark room whose movable walls are illuminated by a fluorescent lamp; 
this time, contrary to the previous study, the subject is stationary in the 
room but, as the walls are moved, he feels as if his body and the chair are 
moving too. Here, it is not the case that our posture influences what we see, 
but, on the contrary, that vision contributes to an illusory proprioceptive 
sense of posture and balance. how can this be possible? our hypothesis 
is that in certain experimental settings in which there are no points of 
reference and no other visible and perceivable reasons that can explain 
the changing of the perceived object, as in our experiment, we can have 
illusory kinaesthetic sensations that could motivate what we are seeing. if 
this hypothesis were reasonable, it would provide other important empirical 
support for the motivating role of kinaesthesia for perception. 
let us come back for a while to the idea of the if-then connections. We 
have said that these connections tell us how the objects of perception 
look in relation to our movements. We will see now, in the end, how these 
connections are correlated to another important feature of perception, the 
one that husserl calls “horizontal intentionality”. in this way we will have 
sketched, at least, the most important aspects of the connection between 
the “sense of our body” and our perceptual experience.
as we have repeatedly said, when we visually perceive a three-dimensional 
object, we always see it from a particular point of view, so that we can 
actually see only one of its profiles. However, through the perceived 
adumbration, we can perceive the object itself– that is, an entire three-
dimensional thing. how can this be possible? husserl’s idea is that the 
hidden sides of the object that are not intuitively given are, nevertheless, co-
apprehended. he states, moreover, that it is only through the co-apprehension 
of the absent profiles that we can see the intuitively given as one profile of the 
object: it is only in relation to the other sides, in fact, that it can appear as one 
face of an entire thing (husserl 1907, 53-68).
This co-apprehension of the horizon of the absent profiles, which allow 
us to see the object itself in the actually seen side, is what husserl calls 
“horizontal intentionality”.
What We see DePenDs on hoW We Move. 
the eMBoDIeD Roots of vIsUaL PeRCePtIon
FranceSca Forlè università Vita-Salute San raffaele
93
now, while the perceivable side of the observed thing is correlated to our 
present orientation in space, the unperceived profiles are nevertheless 
correlated to my kinaesthetic horizon– that is, to the movements and the 
positions i can take thanks to my embodied nature. in this way, the co-
apprehended but momentarily absent aspects can be intended as correlated 
to the perceivable one through some specific if-then connections and they 
can be consequently meant as the backside, the bottom, etc., of the object 
we are perceiving. in other words, to perceive an entire three-dimensional 
thing in and through the adumbration that you actually see means to 
understand how the object’s look would change if you were moving in a 
certain way (Noë 2004, 77) or, as Husserl would say, to know the specific if-
then connections of the object you are perceiving. 
obviously, to perceive an entire three-dimensional thing through its 
adumbration means, at the same time, to know how the perceivable side 
would change if it were the thing itself the one moving around me. this 
means, however, that i should know how the object would change if it were 
moving while i experience a constant kinaesthetic sensation– that is, a sensation 
of stillness. this shows that, in one way or another, our kinaesthetic 
sensations are involved in the constitution of the object of perception, 
because, as we have already stated, every visual perception is, in the 
meantime, the perception of the relationship between the objects in the 
world and me. in this sense, as we have already said in the introduction, 
we can state that to perceive is, in some sense, to have an implicit and pre-
reflective knowledge of our embodied relation to the world.
What we have tried to do in this paper is to provide a description of the 
phenomenology of perception that could account for the primary role of our 
body in the constitution of our perceptual experience. as we have noted, 
this function becomes unquestionable when it comes to an accurate analysis 
that stresses, for example, the role of the body as the bearer of the zero 
point of orientation or of kinaesthesia as the condition of possibility for the 
constitution of perceptual objects.
In this sense, what we have finally found is that only an embodied subject 
with a proprioceptive sense of his body and, in particular, of his states of 
stillness and movement, can make our perceptual experience to be as it is. 
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